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COMMERCIAL TORTS-TRADE SECRETS-ARKANSAS EXTENDS
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION TO CUSTOMER LISTS UNDER THE ARKAN-
SAS TRADE SECRETS ACT. Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45, 823
S.W.2d 824 (1992).
I. FACTS
Johar, Incorporated is in the business of manufacturing handgrips
for use on motorcycles, tools, exercise equipment, and sporting goods.'
Handgrip manufacturing is a very specialized and competitive busi-
ness,2 and the manufacturing equipment utilized by Johar is unique in
the industry.3 Johar has spent many years developing a substantial cus-
tomer base.4
Jerry Allen had been employed by Johar for approximately nine
years when his employment was terminated in the spring of 1990.1 Fol-
lowing his termination, Mr. Allen started his own business, Allen In-
dustries, and began developing handgrip production machinery that
would enable him to compete with Johar. 6
1. Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45, 46, 823 S.W.2d 824, 825 (1992). Johar is an Arkansas
corporation and is located in Forrest City, Arkansas. Record at 50, Allen v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark.
45, 823 S.W.2d 824 (1992) (No. 91-275). Johar has been engaged in the handgrip manufacturing
business for approximately 17 years. Id.
2. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d. at 826. There are approximately six companies engaged in
handgrip manufacture nationwide. Id.
3. Id. at 47-48, 823 S.W.2d at 825-26. Johar originally entered the handgrip business by
purchasing some used machines from a company in California. Id. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
Sometime in the late 1970's Terry Vienna, president and owner of Johar, decided to redesign the
machinery to increase its productivity and efficiency. Id. at 47-48,-823 S.W.2d at 825-26. Under
the guidance of Dave Archer, a former Johar employee knowledgeable in industrial engineering,
the machinery was modified in such a way as to double its'production capacity. Id. at 48, 823
S.W.2d at 826. In addition, Archer made extensive refinements to the machinery to improve its
operating efficiency. Id.
4. Id. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 827. Mr. Vienna testified at trial that it has taken Johar almost
20 years to cultivate its current customer base and that its customer files contain detailed and
specific information on each customer. Id.
5. Record at 53. Mr. Allen's termination was apparently prompted by rumors that he was
preparing to leave Johar. Id. At the time of his termination, Mr. Allen was serving as Johar's sales
manager. He had held that position for most of the term of his employment at Johar. 308 Ark. at
46, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
6. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825. Mr. Allen Flowers, another long-time Johar em-
ployee, also left Johar and went to work for Jerry Allen at Allen Industries. Record at 54. Mr.
Flowers had worked with Dave Archer to modify and service Johar's machinery. 308 Ark. at 48,
823 S.W.2d at 826. It was Mr. Flowers who actually designed and constructed the handgrip
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Upon Mr. Allen's departure, it was discovered that certain cus-
tomer lists, files, and other confidential information were missing from
Johar's office. 7 Terry Vienna, president and owner of Johar, asserted
that Allen had wrongfully taken this information and demanded that it
be returned.8 Mr. Allen denied taking any of Johar's property, but ac-
knowledged that he had contacted several of Johar's customers.'
Johar subsequently filed suit against Allen in St. Francis County
Chancery Court seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages.10 In
its complaint, Johar alleged that Jerry Allen had misappropriated con-
fidential information in duplicating the design of Johar's manufactur-
ing equipment. 1 Furthermore, Johar asserted that Allen had misused
proprietary information in soliciting Johar's customers. 2
During the course of the trial, the chancery court conducted an in-
depth comparison of Allen's and Johar's manufacturing equipment.1 3
The chancellor found that, with relatively minor exceptions, Allen's
machinery was virtually identical to the Johar machinery.1" Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the design of Johar's machinery was
manufacturing equipment for Mr. Allen. Id.
7. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825. Ms. Eva McCoy, a Johar office employee, testified
at trial that following Allen's departure certain customer files were missing. Record at 83. Ms.
McCoy further testified that a customer "call schedule" notebook, inventory list, and customer list
were also missing. Id. at 85-87.
8. Record at 53, 56.
9. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825. Mr. Allen admitted that he had contacted up to ten
of Johar's established customers. Id.
10. Record at 2-3. Johar asked that Allen be temporarily and permanently enjoined from
using any confidential information acquired while he was employed by Johar. Id. at 2. Johar also
requested that Allen Industries be enjoined from using its handgrip manufacturing equipment
which was allegedly modeled after Johar's equipment. Id. at 3. In addition, Johar sought a court
order enjoining Allen from contacting any of Johar's customers.whose identity Allen had gained
knowledge of while employed at Johar. Id.
11. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
12. Id. Johar's complaint also alleged that, during the course of his employment, Allen had
entered into a noncompetition agreement which provided that, upon the termination of his em-
ployment with Johar, Allen would not compete with Johar for three years anywhere in the United
States. Record at 2. Prior to trial, however, Johar admitted that the noncompetition agreement
was overly broad and unreasonable and, therefore, unenforceable. Brief for Appellant at 4, Allen
v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45, 823 S.W.2d 824 (1992) (No. 91-275).
13. 308 Ark. at 47-48, 823 S.W.2d at 825-26. The chancellor not only considered testimony
regarding the machinery, he personally inspected the manufacturing equipment of both Johar and
Allen. Id.
14. Id. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826. Allen's machines were constructed with a larger motor
and included some safety features not on the Johar machines. Id. However, the Allen machinery
was identical in design and method of operation to the Johar machinery. Id.
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protected by the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act (ATSA) 15 and enjoined
Mr. Allen from any further use of his manufacturing equipment."6 Ad-
ditionally, the chancellor ruled that the list of Johar's customers was
protected. under the ATSA and enjoined Mr. Allen from contacting
any of Johar's current customers for eighteen months.
1 7
Jerry Allen appealed the chancery court's order to the Arkansas
Supreme Court." In affirming the chancery court's decision, 9 the court
found that the evidence in the record clearly established that Johar's
machines met the statutory definition of trade secret20 and were enti-
tled to protection under the ATSA.21 In addition, the court held that
Johar's customer list clearly qualified as a trade secret under the
ATSA and, therefore, was also entitled to trade secret protection. 2 Al-
len v. Johar, Inc., 308 Ark. 45, 823 S.W.2d 824 (1992).
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Before a meaningful analysis of trade secret law can be under-
taken, the elemental principles of this area of the law must be deline-
ated. "The fundamental right created by trade secret law is the owner's
entitlement to relief for harm, or potential harm, caused when his trade
secret is taken by misappropriation, that is, improper means. '2 3 Thus,
15. Act of Mar. 12, 1981, No. 439, 1981 Ark. Acts 855 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
75-601 to -607 (Michie 1991)). Under the act, a trade secret is defined as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process that:
(A) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not be-
ing generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use;
and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4) (Michie 1991). The Arkansas Trade Secrets Act is based on the
model act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
16. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825. The chancellor ordered Mr. Allen to dismantle his
productidn machinery. Id.
17. Id. The eighteen month period was to run from the date of the chancellor's order rather
than the date of Mr. Allen's termination. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
20. Id. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4) (Michie 1991); see
also supra note 15.
21. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826.
22. Id. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
23. Ramon A. Klitzke, The Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 64 MARQ. L. REV. 277, 277
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in order for an item to be afforded legal protection as a trade secret, it
must meet two essential requirements: (1) the item must fall within the
definition of the term "trade secret;" and (2) the item must have been
misappropriated from its owner.24
Under the common law principles developed prior to the enact-
ment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,25 which are still relied upon in
jurisdictions that have not adopted the Act, the most comprehensive
definition of the term trade secret, and the one most widely used by the
courts,26 is contained in a comment to section 757 of the Restatement
of Torts.2 7 The comment provides that a trade secret may consist of,
among other things, any formula, device, or compilation of information
which is used in a person's business and which gives him an advantage
over competitors.28
Although the Restatement's definition appears extremely broad, it
contains several important limitations.29 First, in order to be considered
a trade secret, an item must be used continuously in the operation of
the business."0 Second, the item or information must be of the type not
(1980). See also GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS § 3.1 (2d ed. 1988).
24. Id. at 278.
25. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
26. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 278.
27. Klitzkc, supra note 23, at 278.
28. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). The comment reads, in pertinent part, as
follows:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of informa-
tion which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, a
pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. It differs from other secret
information in a business ... in that it is not simply information as to single or ephem-
eral events in the conduct of the business .... A trade secret is a process or device for
continuous use in the operation of the business. Generally it relates to the production of
goods, as, for example, a machine or formula for the production of an article. It may,
however, relate to the sale of goods or to other operations in the business, such as a
code for determining discounts, rebates or other concessions in a price list or catalogue,
or a list of specialized customers, or a method bf bookkeeping or other office
management.
Id. This section was omitted from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1979) because trade
secret law had developed into an independent body of law with decreased reliance on traditional
principles of tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS introductory note to Division Nine
at 1-2 (1979).
29. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 278.
30. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 278. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939),
supra note 28; MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRET LAW § 3.01 (1991).
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generally known in the owner's business."' Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the subject matter of the trade secret must in fact be secret.3 2
Absolute secrecy is not required, but a substantial degree of secrecy is
necessary for an item to qualify as a trade secret. 3
The second critical prerequisite to trade secret protection is that
the trade secret must have been misappropriated from its owner. 34 Un-
like patent and copyright law, which afford broader protection,3 5 trade
secret law generally protects only those trade secrets which have been
taken from their owner by improper or unscrupulous means.36 Some
examples of improper means include acquiring knowledge of the trade
secret through conspiracy, fraud, deceit, or theft.
3 7
Under the common law and Restatement principles discussed
above, countless items have been afforded legal protection as trade
31. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 278.
32. JAGER, supra note 30, § 3.01.
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). With regard to the requirement of se-
crecy, comment b provides the following:
The subject matter of a trade secret must be secret. Matters of public knowledge or of
general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated by one as his secret .... [The
owner of a trade secret] may, without losing his protection, communicate it to employ-
ees involved in its use .... Nevertheless, a substantial element of secrecy must exist, so
that, except by the use of improper means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the
information.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. See also Klitzke, supra note 23, at 279.
35. ALEXANDER. supra note 23, § 3.1.
36. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 recognizes several situations in which trade secrets will
be deemed to have been misappropriated. The section provides that:
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret without a privilege to do so, is liable to
the other if:
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts [sic]
that it was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper
means or that the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his
duty to the other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts [sic] that it was a secret and
that its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). Thus, under § 757, misappropriation occurs when a trade
secret is disclosed or taken by improper means, or there is a breach of a confidential relationship.
It should be reiterated that the provisions set forth above are still relied upon in many jurisdictions
which have not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. See Myrphy K. Readio, Minnesota De-
velopments, Balancing Employer's Trade Secret Interests in High Technology Products Against
Employees' Rights and Public Interests in Minnesota, 69 MINN. L. REV. 984, 987, 990 (1985).
37. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 279-80.
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secrets while many others have been held not entitled to protection- 8
With regard to protectability, one of the most difficult and extensively
litigated issues is the extent to which lists of customers should be af-
forded protection. 9 Customer lists stand at the outer limits of trade
secret law.4" Many businesses devote substantial efforts to developing
and maintaining customer lists and relationships which they consider to
be among their most valuable "trade secrets." '41 On the other hand,
public policy concerns over unreasonable restraints on legitimate com-
petition weigh against protecting customer lists.42
In the employment context, it is well settled that an employee, un-
less contractually prohibited, may, upon the termination of his employ-
ment, compete with his former employer, provided the competition is
conducted fairly and legally.4 However, many courts have prohibited a
former employee from soliciting his former employer's customers where
the former employee utilized confidential information or customer lists
gained in the course of employment to facilitate such solicitation.44 Un-
fortunately, these courts have failed to establish a predominant theory
or general rule as to the circumstances in which such solicitation will
be prohibited.45 As a result, the law with regard to customer list protec-
tion, as with the entire field of trade secret law, has developed unsys-
tematically and varies significantly between jurisdictions applying com-
mon law principles.4"
At common law, prior to the adoption of the ATSA,47 Arkansas
38. For a thorough listing of items that may or may not qualify as trade secrets see ROGER
M. MILGRIM. MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.09 (1992).
39. Id. § 2.09[7].
40. Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 955 (1964)
[hereinafter Competitive Torts].
41. MILGRIM, supra note 38, § 2.09[7].
42. Competitive Torts, supra note 40, at 955-56. This is especially true when the one mak-
ing use of the customer lists is the former employee of the one seeking trade secret protection. Id.
at 956. As one New York court has pointed out, "there are powerful considerations of public
policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man's livelihood .... Purchasing Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245, 247 (N.Y. 1963).
43. K. H. Larsen, Annotation, Former Employee's Duty, in Absence of Express Contract,
Not to Solicit Former Employer's Customers or Otherwise Use His Knowledge of Customer Lists
Acquired in Earlier Employment, 28 A.L.R. 3d 7, 18 (1969) [hereinafter Larsen, Customer
Lists]. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(a) (1958).
44. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:2 (2d ed.
1984). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396(b) (1958).
45. Larsen, Customer Lists, supra note 43, at 25.
46. See generally Larsen, Customer Lists, supra note 43 (encyclopedic treatment of various
levels of protection afforded customer lists in different jurisdictions).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (Michie 1991). See supra note 15.
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courts defined a trade secret as a "secret formula, method, or device
that gives one an advantage over competitors."4 8 Obviously, this defini-
tion was far more narrow than that provided by the Restatement.49 De-
spite its restrictiveness, Arkansas courts continued to apply this defini-
tion and implicity rejected the Restatement's more expansive
formulation.50
The Arkansas Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether
a customer list qualified as a trade secret in El Dorado Laundry Co. v.
Ford.5" In that case, the laundry company sought an injunction prohib-
iting Ford, a former employee, from soliciting the customers whom
Ford had served while working for the laundry company.52 The court
held that the names of the customers on Ford's laundry route were not
a trade secret and, therefore, the laundry company was not entitled to
relief.53 The court reasoned that, under the facts of the case, an injunc-
tion against Ford would have been an unreasonable restraint on free-
dom of employment.54
In Witmer v. Arkansas Dailies, Inc.55 the corporation sought an
injunction against Witmer, a former director and officer of the corpora-
tion, prohibiting him from soliciting the corporation's customers.5 6 The
48. Miller v. Fairfield Bay, Inc., 247 Ark. 565, 570 n.4, 446 S.W.2d 660, 663 n.4 (1969)
(quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1969)). See also Orkin
Extermination Co. v. Weaver, 257 Ark. 926, 931, 521 S.W.2d 69, 72 (1975) (Fogleman, J., dis-
senting); Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 253 Ark. 750, 751, 489 S.W.2d 1, '3 (1973).
49. See supra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
50. See MILGRIM, supra note 38, § 2.01. Prior to the decision in Miller v. Fairfield Bay,
two federal courts, purportedly applying Arkansas law, cited the Restatement's definition of trade
secret with approval. See Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Co., 407 F.2d 1129, 1135 (8th Cir. 1969); Harris
Manufacturing Co. v. Williams, 157 F. Supp. 779, 786 (W.D. Ark. 1957). The court in Miller,
however, articulated a more narrow definition of the term, and subsequent Arkansas courts were
not inclined to expand it. See, e.g., Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc. v. Vroman, 250 Ark. 750, 751, 489
S.W.2d I, 3 (1973).
51. 174 Ark. 104, 294 S.W. 393 (1927).
52. Id. at 105, 294 S.W. at 394.
53. Id. at 106-07, 294 S.W. at 394. The court apparently drew a distinction between the use
of a printed customer list and the use of memorized information. Id. The uncontradicted evidence
at the trial showed that, although he had access to a printed customer list, Ford had only solicited
customers with whom he had become familiar during his employment at the laundry company. Id.
at 106, 294 S.W. at 394.
54. Id. at 106, 294 S.W. at 394. The court noted that any restraint on freedom of employ-
ment, without some reasonable limitations, was similar to a contract in restraint of trade in that
they were both "contrary to public policy, and unenforceable." Id.
55. 202 Ark. 470, 151 S.W.2d 971 (1941).
56. Id. at 473-75, 151 S.W.2d at 972-74. Arkansas Dailies was engaged in the business of
soliciting advertising from manufacturers for placement in newspapers on a contract basis. Id. at
472, 151 S.W.2d at 972. Witmer had organized a company that would directly compete with
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Arkansas Supreme Court held that the corporation was not entitled to
the relief it sought because it was not engaged in a business which
involved any trade secrets.57 The court stated that there was no proof
that Witmer, in pursuing his new business, had used any confidential
information, trade secrets, or anything else that he had acquired from
the corporation.58
In 1975 the Arkansas Supreme Court decided Orkin Extermina-
tion Co. v. Weaver,59 a case which involved a covenant not to com-
pete. 0 Although it did not directly address the issue, the court clearly
indicated that it did not believe customer lists qualified as trade
secrets. 1 The only trade secret at issue in the case concerned Orkin's
technical manuals regarding pesticides.62 The court's discussion of
Orkin's list of customers was totally separate.63 The court concluded
Arkansas Dailies. Id. at 474, 151 S.W.2d at 973. However, he did not solicit business from Ar-
kansas Dailies' patrons until their contracts with Arkansas Dailies had expired. Id. at 477, 151
S.W.2d at 974. Prior to soliciting any business from Arkansas Dailies' customers, Witmer had
resigned as both officer and director of the corporation. Id. at 473, 151 S.W.2d at 972. Thus, a
fiduciary relationship between Witmer and Arkansas Dailies no longer existed at the time of the
solicitations. Id.
57. Id. at 475, 151 S.W.2d at 973. The court apparently based this holding on the fact that
Arkansas Dailies was nothing more than a "service corporation." See id.
58. Id. at 477, 151 S.W.2d at 974. The court quoted an earlier Iowa case for the proposition
that "[an employee, on leaving his employer's service is guilty of no legal wrong in profiting by
the experience and knowledge gained in the service." Id. (quoting H. W. Gossard Co. v. Crosby,
109 N.W. 483 (Iowa 1906)). The court also appeared to be influenced by the fact there was not a
provision in Witmer's employment contract which prohibited him from competing with the corpo-
ration in the event he should leave its employment. Id. at 473, 151 S.W.2d at 972.
59. 257 Ark. 926, 521 S.W.2d 69 (1975).
60. Id. at 927, 521 S.W.2d at 70. Weaver's employment contract contained a provision in
which he agreed not to engage in the pest control business within a certain area for a period of
two years after the termination of his employment with Orkin. Id. For a thorough discussion of
Arkansas law regarding the enforceability of covenants not to compete see John R. Pagan, Arkan-
sas Courts and Covenants Not to Compete, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 57 (1989-90).
61. See 257 Ark. at 927, 521 S.W.2d at 70. The court stated that the issues involved in the
case were whether Weaver had access to trade secrets, special training, confidential information,
or customer lists belonging to Orkin. 257 Ark. 927, 521 S.W.2d 70 (citing Orkin Extermination
Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185 (1947)). By referring to trade secrets and customer
lists in the disjunctive, the court made it clear that, although a customer list might be a protect-
able property interest in appropriate circumstances, it did not believe that a customer list qualified
as a trade secret.
62. See 257 Ark. at 928, 521 S.W.2d at 70. The court concluded that the information
contained in Orkin's technical manual was readily available to the public and not protectable as a
trade secret. id.
63. Id. at 929, 521 S.W.2d at 71. Orkin never asserted that its customer list constituted a
trade secret. See id. at 930, 521 S.W.2d at 71. It merely sought to enforce the restrictive covenant
contained in Weaver's employment contract. Id. at 927, 521 S.W.2d at 70.
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that the restrictive covenant in Weaver's employment contract was un-
reasonable and, therefore, invalid.6"
As the preceding discussion partially illustrates, prior to the enact-
ment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 5 the common law of trade
secrets "languishe[d] in a deepening maze of conflict and confusion."66
This is true despite the fact that trade secret law is obviously of para-
mount importance in preserving the confidentiality of commerically val-
uable information, inventions, and ideas and should receive a uniform
application as an independent body of law.67 Although the adoption of
the Restatement of Torts in 1939 greatly contributed to the gradual
evolution of the common law of trade secrets, 8 it lacked the compre-
hensiveness and uniformity necessary for the development of a coher-
ent, systematic, and exhaustive body of law.69 Furthermore, the Re-
statement did not adequately address certain essential areas of trade
secret law.70 The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the common
law of trade secrets was exacerbated by the deletion of all sections re-
lating to trade secret law from the second edition of the Restatement of
Torts.71 The reporters of the American Law Institute suggested that
trade secrets law was no longer based primarily on tort principles and,
therefore, its inclusion in the Restatement (Second) of Torts would be
inappropriate.
72
64. Id. at 930-31, 521 S.W.2d at 71-72. The court stated that the covenant not to compete
in the Orkin employment contract was "directed not against unfair competition but against com-
petition of any kind on the part of its former employees." Id. at 929, 521 S.W.2d at 71. "Needless
to say, the law does not provide any such protection from ordinary competition." Id. at 930, 521
S.W.2d at 71. See also Pagan, supra note 60, at 61-63.
65. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
66. Comment, Theft of Trade Secrets: The Need for a Statutory Solution, 120 U. PA. L.
REV. 378, 378 (1971) [hereinafter Comment].
67. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 282.
68. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text.
69. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 282.
70. ALEXANDER, supra note 23, § 3.1. The Restatement did not address the issue of an
appropriate statute of limitations. Id. It also failed to provide adequate guidance on the issue of
damages. Id.
71. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 283.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS introductory note to Division Nine at 1-2 (1979).
The introductory note stated that:
[Tihe influence of Tort law [on trade secret law] has continued to decrease ... and the
law of Unfair Competition and Trade Regulation is no more dependent upon Tort law
than it is on many other general fields of the law and upon broad statutory develop-
ments, particularly at the federal level. The Council formally reached the decision that
these chapters no longer belong in the Restatement of Torts, and they are omitted from
this Second Restatement.
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The common law of trade secrets stood in this unsettled state when
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in 1979."' The Uniform Act
codifies the generally accepted principles of common law trade secret
protection with some modifications based on the better reasoned cases
concerning remedies for trade secret misappropriation." The Uniform
Act contains general concepts intended to promote uniformity and pre-
dictability in the litigation of trade secret issues.
7 5
Arguably, the most important section of the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act is the definitions section 76 which "delineates the substan-
tive rights created by the Act."' 7 This section defines the terms "trade
secret,''7  "misappropriation, ' '7 "improper means,"8  and "person""1 as
Id. The omission of § 757 from the second edition of the Restatement has forced states which
have not adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act to rely on principles established before 1939. See
Readio, supra note 36, at 990.
73. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990 & Supp. 1992). The Commissioner's
prefatory note states that "[n]otwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law
to interstate business, this law has not developed satisfactorily. In the first place its development is
uneven .. . .Secondly . . . there is undue uncertainty concerning the parameters of trade secret
protection, and the appropriate remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret." UNIF. TRADE
SECRETS ACT prefatory note, 14 U.LA. at 434 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
74. Id. at 434-35 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
75. Id.
76. UNIF TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, 14 U.LA. at 437-39 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
77. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 284.
78. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) reads as follows:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Id., 14 U.L.A. at 438 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
79. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) defines "misappropriation" as:
(i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to know
that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by
a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was
(1) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(11) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(111) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
702
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used in the Act. The remaining sections of the Act deal with, among
other things, appropriate .remedies for misappropriation of a trade se-
cret,82 a statute of limitations, 83 and the effect the Act has on conflict-
ing law.84
As of 1991, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act had been adopted, in
various forms, in thirty-six states85 and the District of Columbia.86 Ar-
kansas adopted the ATSA in 198187 with only minor departures from
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired
by accident or mistake.
Id., 14 U.LA. at 438 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
80. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) states that "improper means" include theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means. Id., 14 U.LA. at 437 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
81. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(3) defines the term "person" as "a natural person, cor-
poration, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, govern-
mental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity." Id., 14 U.L.A. at 438
(1990 & Supp. 1992).
82. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 2-5, 14 U.L.A. at 449-61 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
83. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 6. Under this section, an action for misappropriation of a
trade secret must be commenced within three years after the misappropriation is discovered or
reasonably should have been discovered. Id., 14 UL.A. at 462 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
84. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 7. The Act displaces any prior conflicting law pertaining
to civil remedies for trade secret misappropriation. Id., 14 U.L.A. at 463 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
85. ALA. CODE §§ 8-27-1 to -6 (Supp. 1991); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (Supp.
1991); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-401 to -407 (Supp. 1991); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to
-607 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.10 (West Supp. 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 7-74-101 to -110 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 1987); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001-.009 (West 1990); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 48-801 to -807 (Supp. 1991); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 140, para. 351-359 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8
(Burns 1991); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1-.8 (West Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to
-3330 (1987 & Supp. 1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880-.900 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431 to :1439 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§§ 1541-1548 (West Supp. 1991); MD. COM. LAW I CODE ANN. §§ l1-1201 to -1209 (1990);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -
19 (1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507
(Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010-.100 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 350-B:1-:9 (Supp. 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (Michie Supp. 1991); ND.
CENT. CODE §§ 47-25.1-01 to -08 (Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (West 1987
& Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -l (Supp.
1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-29-1 to -11 (Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1
to -9 (Supp. 1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1991); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (West 1989); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-22-1 to -10 (1992); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 1989). '
86. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-501 to -510 (1981).
87. See supra note 15.
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the text of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in effect at the time.s8 Those
jurisdictions which have not adopted the Act continue to rely on the
Restatement of Torts and the common law principles previously
discussed.8 9
One of the express purposes of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is
to promote uniformity in the litigation of trade secret issues among the
states enacting it.90 Nevertheless, even among states which have
adopted the Act, a few areas of trade secret law remain uncertain.91
One of these areas of uncertainty is the extent to which customer lists
should be afforded trade secret protection.92 Courts in several jurisdic-
tions which have adopted the Act have extended trade secret protection
to customer lists, 93 while courts in other jurisdictions adopting the Act
have refused to do so."' A review of the cases indicates, however, that
the inconsistent treatment afforded customer lists is a function of the
unique facts of each case rather than of unsound interpretation of the
Act's definition of trade secret.95
For instance, two recent California cases aptly illustrate that not
all customer lists will qualify for trade secret protection.9" In American
Paper & Packaging Products v. Kirgan,9 7 the plaintiff, a shipping ma-
terial supply company, brought suit against two former employees seek-
88. The Uniform Act was amended in 1985, however, the amendments did not significantly
affect the substantive rights created by the Act. See UNIF TRADE SECRETS ACT, §§ 1-12, 14
U.L.A. 433-67 (1990 & Supp. 1992). Note also that Arkansas did not adopt the last five sections
of the Uniform Act. The omission of these sections is relatively inconsequential. Compare ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (Michie 1991) with UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12, 14
U.LA. 433-67 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
89. See supra notes 27-46, 65-72 and accompanying text.
90. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 8, 14 UL.A. at 465 (1990 & Supp. 1992).
91. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 290-92.
92. Henry J. Silberberg & Eric G. Lardiere, Eroding Protection of Customer Lists and
Customer Information Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 42 Bus. LAW. 487, 489 (1987).
93. See, e.g., American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Ct. App. 1989);
Michels v. Dyna-Kote Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. App. 1986); Kozuch v. CRA-MAR
Video Ctr., Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. App. 1986); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d
773 (Wis. 1989); B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 414 N.W.2d 48 (Wis. App. 1987).
94. See, e.g., American Paper & Packaging Prods. v. Kirgan, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App.
1986); Templeton v. Creative Loafing, Inc., 552 So. 2d 288 (Fla. App. 1989); Crown Holding
Corp. v. Larson, 410 N.W.2d 373 (Minn. App. 1987).
95. See Silberberg & Lardiere, supra note 92, at 489. Note that virtually every court which
has addressed the issue has acknowledged that customer lists may be protected as a trade secret
under the Act. Id.
96. See American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks, 262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Ct. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Paper & Packaging Prods. v. Kirgan, 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1986).
97. 228 Cal. Rptr. 713 (Ct. App. 1986).
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ing to enjoin them from soliciting its customers or disclosing its cus-
tomer lists to competitors.98 As grounds for the injunction, American
Paper asserted that its customer list qualified as a trade secret.99 The
court first determined that customer lists could qualify as trade secrets
under the California version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in cer-
tain circumstances. 100 In this case, however, the court held that Ameri-
can Paper's customer list was not protectable as a trade secret because
it was readily ascertainable by proper means10 1 and, therefore, did not
fit within the Act's definition of trade secret.102
In American Credit Indemnity Co. v. Sacks 03 the plaintiff, Amer-
ican Credit Indemnity (ACI), was a national underwriter of credit in-
surance.0 4 The potential customers for credit insurance were compa-
nies with annual revenues in excess of two million dollars and large
accounts receivable."' However, only about six and one-half percent of
these potential customers actually purchased credit insurance.0 6 Sacks,
who had been an ACI agent for over nine years, resigned from ACI to
form an independent insurance agency and solicited several of ACI's
clients." 7 ACI subsequently filed suit against Sacks seeking injunctive
relief and damages." 8 The court held that ACI's list of policyholders
98. Id. A dispute arose between American Paper and the former employees over commis-
sion payments. Id. at 714. The former employees left American Paper and went to work for one of
its competitors. Id.
99. Id. at 715.
100. Id. at 716. The court pointed out that any prior California case law to the contrary
was superseded by the adoption of the Act. Id.
101. Id. at 717. The court stated that:
While the information sought to be protected here, that is lists of customers . . . may
not be generally known to the public, they certainly would be known or readily ascer-
tainable to other persons in the shipping business. The compilation process in this case
is neither sophisticated nor difficult nor particularly time consuming.
Id. The former employees had developed their list of customers by making "cold calls" to compa-
nies that might be in need of shipping services. Id. at 714.
102. Id. at 717. See supra note 78.
103. 262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Ct. App. 1989).
104. Id. at 93. Credit insurance is sold to manufacturers, wholesalers, and service organiza-
tions that sell on credit terms and is designed to protect the insured from excessive bad debt
losses. Id. Only three firms offered this type of insurance, and American Credit was the leader in
the field. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. ACI had compiled a list of potential customers who had exhibited an interest in
purchasing credit insurance. Id. at 97.
107. Id. at 94. Upon departure from ACI, Sacks sent a letter to the ACI customers for
whom she had provided services while at ACI announcing the formation of her new agency and
inviting them to contact her. Id.
108. Id. In its complaint, ACI alleged that Sacks had misappropriated certain ACI trade
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constituted a trade secret under the California version of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act' 09 and that Sacks had misappropriated that trade
secret."' Accordingly, the court concluded that ACI was entitled to
injunctive relief.1 1'
Prior to the decision in Allen, no Arkansas court had ever been
called upon to interpret the ATSA. However, two federal courts, apply-
ing Arkansas law, did have occasion to consider the Act's definition of
"trade secret. ' 1 2
In Hi-Line Electric Co. v. Moore"3 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals was called upon to determine whether the electric company's
list of customers met the definition of a trade secret." 4 Moore had
worked for the electric company as a salesman for approximately six
years when he resigned" 5 and began selling a similar product in direct
competition with Hi-Line."6 The electric company filed suit against
Moore alleging that its customer information was a trade secret which
Moore had misappropriated." 7 The court affirmed the judgment of the
secrets in soliciting business from ACI's customers. Id. These trade secrets included ACI's client
list, list of potential clients, and other specialized client information. Id.
109. Id. at 97. The court stated that the ACI client list and related information was infor-
mation with potential economic value, as required under the Act, "because it allows a competitor
to direct sales efforts to the elite 6.5 percent of those potential customers which already have
evinced a predisposition to purchase credit insurance." Id. The court also found that ACI had
taken reasonable steps to maintain the secrecy of its customer list. Id. The court based this find-
ing, in part, on the fact that ACI required its employees to sign a confidentiality agreement re-
garding its customer list. Id. Note, however, that this confidentiality agreement was not before the
court and was not the basis for its decision. Id.
110. Id. at 98. The court found that Sacks' announcement letter went beyond a mere "pro-
fessional announcerment and constituted a solicitation of the ACI customer list." Id. The court felt
that such a solicitation amounted to a misappropriation as defined in the Act. Id.
111. Id. at 101. The court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to fashion
the appropriate injunctive relief. Id. The trial court had originally held that money damages pro-
vided ACI with an adequate remedy and refused to enjoin Sacks from further solicitation of
ACI's clients. Id. at 96.
112. See Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Moore, 775 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1985); United Centrifugal
Pumps v. Cusimano, 708 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
113. 775 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1985).
114. Id. at 997. The electric company was a supplier of industrial electrical parts and acces-
sories. Id.
115. Id. The electric company requested that Moore execute a new employment agreement
which contained a covenant not to compete. Id. Moore refused and resigned immediately thereaf-
ter. Id.
116. Id. In his new position, Moore called upon many of the customers whom he had ser-
viced for Hi-Line. Id.
117. Id. Hi-Line did not claim that Moore had taken any printed customer lists; it asserted
that Moore should not be allowed to solicit business from customers he became familiar with
while employed by Hi-Line. Id.
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district court which had held that Hi-Line's customer information was
readily ascertainable 1 8 and, therefore, not within the definition of trade
secret as provided by the ATSA."'
In United Centrifugal Pumps v. Cusimano"2 O the plaintiff, United
Centrifugal Pumps (U.C.P.), filed suit against two former employees
seeking a preliminary injunction prohibiting them from marketing au-
tomated welding services to U.C.P. customers or potential customers.' '
U.C.P. claimed that both its welding system and customer list were
trade secrets.' 22 The court held that U.C.P. had not carried its burden
of proving that its customer list was not readily ascertainable by proper
means 123 as required by the ATSA.' z4
Although the courts in Hi-Line Electric and United Centrifugal
Pumps refused to protect the customer lists before them, neither court
implied that customer lists were not appropriate subject matter for
trade secret protection under the ATSA . 5 These cases simply illus-
trate that whether a particular customer list is entitled to trade secret
protection is a question of fact that will depend on the unique circum-
stances of each case.
126
III. REASONING OF THE COURT IN ALLEN
In January 1992 the Arkansas Supreme Court was called upon for
the first time to interpret the Arkansas Trade Secrets Act in Allen v.
118. Id. The district court found that Moore had developed up to 80% of the customers he
had serviced while at Hi-Line and that he had not misappropriated any information. Id. Accord-
ing to the court, the reason for Moore's success in his new position was customer loyalty not unfair
competition. Id.
119. Id. See supra note 15.
120. 708 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Ark. 1988).
121. Id. at 1041. It is important to note that this case came before the court on U.C.P.'s
motion for a preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of the case on the merits. Id. As the
court pointed out, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and the movant must bear
a significant burden of persuasion to prevail. Id. at 1042.
122. Id. at 1043. The former employees asserted that they did not use U.C.P.'s trade secrets
in developing their welding system and that the identities of U.C.P.'s customers were readily as-
certainable by proper means. Id. at 1041-43.
123. Id. at 1043. The court also stated that, on the record before it, it could not determine
if U.C.P.'s welding system constituted a trade secret. id. The court pointed out that in denying the
preliminary injunction, it was not in any way ruling on the merits of the case. Id. at 1044.
124. See supra note 15.
125. As a matter of fact, both courts implicitly recognized that a customer list might be
entitled to protection as a trade secret in the appropriate circumstances. See Hi-Line Elec., 755
F.2d at 997; United Centrifugal Pumps, 708 F.Supp. at 1043.
126. Klitzke, supra note 23, at 290.
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Johar, Inc. 27 The court began its analysis by reviewing the definitions
of "trade secret" '28  and "misappropriation" 2 9 as provided by the
ATSA. The court pointed out that actual or threatened misappropria-
tion of a trade secret may be enjoined under the Act.
13 0
The court then addressed the chancery court's ruling that Johar's
manufacturing equipment was protected under the ATSA.13 1 At trial,
Jerry Allen argued that Johar had not developed the dual capacity pro-
duction machinery which it sought to protect as a trade secret.132 To
support this argument, Allen introduced testimony that another com-
pany involved in handgrip manufacturing, Halstead Industrial Prod-
ucts, also utilized dual capacity machinery.3 3 Johar's witness, on the
other hand, testified that he had inspected the Halstead machines, and
they were not similar to the ones used by Johar. 34
The court emphasized that the chancellor had made detailed find-
ings of fact and personally viewed both companies' machines. 135 The
chancellor had found that Allen's machinery was virtually identical to
the machinery designed and used by Johar 131 and that Allen's machin-
ery had been built by a former Johar employee.137 Furthermore, the
127. 308 Ark. 45, 823 S.W.2d at 824 (1992).
128. Id. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825. See supra note 15.
129. 308 Ark. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(2) (Michie 1991),
which defines "misappropriation" as used in the Act, is identical to UNIF: TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(2), 14 UL.A at 438 (1990 & Supp. 1992). See supra note 79.
130. 308 Ark. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-604(a) (Michie
1991)). Although the court did not explicitly so hold, Jerry Allen's use of Johar's customer list
and equipment disign clearly constituted a misappropriation of information. See id. At the time he
used the information, Jerry Allen "knew or had reason to know that his knowledge of [Johar's
customer list and equipment design] was . . .[a]cquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty
to maintain its secrecy or limit its use ...." See id. See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ l(2)(ii)(B)(1), supra note 79; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(2)(B)(ii)(b).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826. See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
133. 308 Ark. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826. However, Halstead was no longer in the handgrip
manufacturing business and had sold its machines to another company, Cal-Tackle, in the early
1980's. Id.
134. Id. Dave Archer, Johar's witness and former employee, testified that he had inspected
the machines when Cal-Tackle offered to sell them to Johar. Id. Archer further testified that
Johar had not bought these machines because they were not of the same design as Johar's ma-
chines. Id. In its ruling protecting Johar's machinery, the chancery court correctly pointed out
that Johar's machinery need not be the only machinery of its type in order to qualify as a trade
secret. Record at 58.
135. 308 Ark. at 47, 823 S.W.2d at 825. The chancellor visited the plants of both Johar,
Inc. and Allen Industries to inspect the machinery. Record at 54.
136. 308 Ark. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
137. 308 Ark. at 48, 823 S.W.2d at 826. At trial, Allen Flowers, the former Johar em-
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chancellor found that Johar had taken reasonable precautions to main-
tain the secrecy of its dual production machinery"3 8 as required by the
ATSA.139 In affirming the chancery court's holding, the court con-
cluded that "the evidence in the record clearly establishes that Johar's
machines fit under the definition of trade secret in Ark. Code Ann.
§ 4-75-601(4)."'t"o
The court then turned to the issue of whether Johar's customer list
constituted a trade secret under the ATSA. 1 1 The court first dispensed
with prior Arkansas case law which held that customer lists were not
entitled to trade secret protecton" 2 by stressing that those cases were
decided prior to the enactment of the ATSA.14 a The court next took
notice of cases in other jurisdictions which have afforded trade secret
protection to customer lists.""
The court's first consideration regarding Johar's customer list was
whether the information contained therein was readily ascertainable by
proper means. 45 Johar maintained detailed information on its custom-
ers, and Terry Vienna testified that it would take several years of work
for a competitor to compile similar information. 14 The court found
that the potential users of Johar's product would not be easily ascer-
tainable. 14 7 The court distinguished Hi-Line Electric4 ' by pointing out
ployee, asserted that he had not learned of the dual capacity technology while working for Johar.
Id. Johar introduced evidence contradicting Mr. Flower's testimony. Id. Having considered the
conflicting testimony, the chancellor ruled that all of Mr. Flower's knowledge regarding dual ca-
pacity machinery came from his familiarity with the Johar machinery. Record at 58.
138. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826. The chancellor apparently based this ruling on the
fact that Terry Vienna, President of Johar, did not allow tours of the Johar plant. Id.
139. Id. Reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of a trade secret are a prerequisite to
legal protection under ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4)(B) (Michie 1991). See supra note 15.
140. 308 Ark. at 48-49, 823 S.W.2d at 826.
141. Id. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826.
142. Id. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
143. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-602 (Michie 1991) states
that the ATSA displaces any conflicting Arkansas law regarding civil liability for misappropria-
tion of a trade secret.
144. 308 Ark, at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826. See, e.g., American Credit Indem. Co. v. Sacks,
262 Cal. Rptr. 92 (Ct. App. 1989); Michels v. Dyna-Kote Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. App.
1986); Minuteman, Inc. v. Alexander, 434 N.W.2d 773 (Wis. 1989).
145. 308 Ark. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 826-27. In order to meet the definition of trade
secret, the "information" must not be readily ascertainable by proper means by one who could
obtain economic value from its use. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-601(4)(A) (Michie 1991). See supra
note 15.
146. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 827. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
147. 308 Ark, at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. Vienna testified that Johar's substantial customer
base had been accumulated through years of attending trade shows and subscribing to trade
magazines. Id.
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that the former employee in that case had developed most of Hi-Line's
customers himself, while here there was no showing that Allen had de-
veloped any of Johar's customers.'49 The court concluded that the iden-
tities of Johar's customers were not readily ascertainable by conven-
tional means as required by the ATSA.1
50
The court's analysis then shifted to whether Johar had taken rea-
sonable precautions to preserve the secrecy of its customer list as re-
quired by the ATSA.' 5' The chancery court had found that Johar's
customer list was imparted to employees in confidence, was not to leave
the business premises, and that outdated customer printouts were de-
stroyed as a matter of company policy.'52 The Arkansas Supreme
Court concluded, largely on the basis of the chancellor's findings, that
Johar's efforts to maintain the secrecy of its customers' identities were
reasonable under the circumstances.' 53 Thus, the court declared that
the evidence "clearly supports the chancellor's holding that Johar's cus-
tomer lists meet the requirements of protection as a trade secret."'
' 54
Finally, the court addressed Allen's argument that even if Johar's
written customer list was protectable as a trade secret, the customer list
he retained in his memory should not be protected. 55 The court sum-
marily dismissed this argument by stating that "whether the customer
information used was written down or memorized is immaterial, and
the proper issue is whether the information is protectable as a trade
secret."' 56 The court concluded that, under the circumstances of the
148.. Id. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. See Hi-Line Elec. Co. v. Moore, 775 F.2d 996 (8th
Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
149. 308 Ark. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
150. Id.
151. Id. See supra note 139.
152. 308 Ark. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. Allen did not actually claim that he should be allowed to use Johar's written cus-
tomer list. Id. "Instead, he mainly challenges the chancellor's holding requiring him to erase from
his memory the names of Johar's customers." Id. While this is not an unfamiliar argument, many
commentators feel that the distinction between written and memorized customer information is
irrelevant. E.g., 2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION. TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES
§ 14.31, at 110 (4th ed. 1986).
156. 308 Ark. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827 (citing 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29.5 (2d ed. 1984)). In his treatise, Professor McCarthy points out that:
In denying ... relief [to an employer], some courts have pointed out that the employee
took no written information regarding customers, but merely used memorized informa-
tion. Such courts apparently proceed upon the assumption that the fact that the alleg-
edly confidential information was not written down tends to prove that it is not in fact
protectable, and constitutes part of the general knowledge and experience of the em-
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case, Johar's customer list was a protectable trade secret regardless of
its form.157
In his dissent, Justice Newbern, joined by Justices Brown and
Dudley, contended that the majority had erred with respect to Johar's
memorized customer list.158 The dissent first pointed out that, even af-
ter the adoption of the ATSA, the Arkansas Court of Appeals "contin-
ued to consider protection of a customer list separately from protection
of a trade secret." '59 Justice Newbern then turned to the language of
the ATSA and concluded that Johar's written list of customers un-
doubtedly fit within the Act's definition of trade secret.16 0 The dissent
did not believe, however, that the list of Johar's customers retained in
Allen's mind was entitled to trade secret protection."' The dissenting
justices were not convinced that Johar had taken reasonable efforts to
protect the secrecy of the memorized list as required by the ATSA.1' 2
ployee. Other courts hold that it is immaterial whether the information is written or
memorized, as the issue is whether the information is legally protectable property of the
employer. The latter view appears more reasonable. The mere fact that an ex-employee
has a good memory and needs no tangible records seems to be a slender reed upon
which to hang a finding of nonliability. If the information used is protectable, it should
make little difference whether the employee had to write it down or not. It cannot be
absolutely stated that an ex-employee can use any customer information so long as he
does not write it down.
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29.5 (2d ed. 1984) (first
emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
157. 308 Ark. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
158. Id. at 52, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 51, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting). In Girard v. Rebsamen Ins.
Co., 14 Ark. App. 154, 685 S.W.2d 526 (1985), a case involving a covenant not to compete, the
Court of Appeals held that the insurance company's customer list was not a trade secret, but that
"its customer list and related information were protected interests." Id. at 157, 685 S.W.2d at
527-28. Note, however, that the Court of Appeals did not even refer to the ATSA in so holding.
Allen, 308 Ark. at 51, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting). Following the Girard deci-
sion, the Court of Appeals has continued to treat trade secrets and customer lists as separate
subjects. Id. See Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 36 Ark. App. 99, 818 S.W.2d 596 (1991);
Duffner v. Alberty, 19 Ark. App. 137, 718 S.W.2d 111 (1986). It should be emphasized that the
decisions in both Federated Mutual and Duffner also turned on the enforceability of covenants not
to compete, and that the ATSA was not at issue in either case.
160. 308 Ark. at 52, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting). Prior to reaching this
conclusion, Justice Newbern pondered whether the ATSA has "elevated to the status of 'trade
secret' the customer list previously protected only by the common law of unfair competition?" Id.
Recall that in Arkansas, however, the common law provided precious little protection for customer
lists. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
161. 308 Ark. at 52, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern,*J., dissenting).
162. Id. The dissent argued that the only reasonable effort an employer can make to protect
a list of customers not in writing, but retained in an employee's memory, is to enter a reasonable
noncompetition agreement with the employee. Id. The dissent then accused the chancery court of
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Justice Newbern was also concerned that protecting memorized
customer lists as trade secrets would "lead to problems which could be
avoided if the holding were limited to lists in writing."1 3 Finally, the
dissenters questioned how, if Johar's customer list qualified as a trade
secret, it could cease to so qualify at the end of eighteen months.164 The
dissent concluded by reiterating its position that only written customer
lists should be protected as trade secrets under the ATSA, and that the
only way an employer can reasonably maintain the secrecy of a memo-
rized list of its customers is to enter a reasonable noncompetition agree-
ment with its employees.'
IV. ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE
The Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Allen is obviously of
great significance. For the first time, an Arkansas court has afforded
trade secret protection to a confidential customer list in the absence of
a covenant not to compete. 6 The decision appears to be a drastic de-
parture from the precedent established by such cases as El Dorado
Laundry.' However, as the court correctly pointed out, those cases
were decided prior to the enactment of the ATSA and are no longer
controlling. 16 8
The court in Allen was presented with trade secret litigation be-
tween an employer and its former employee."6 ' Inherent in any such
litigation is a tension between the employer's interest in preserving the
secrecy of its trade secret, whether it is a process, formula, or customer
list, and the employee's interest in economic mobility and freedom of
employment. A further consideration in such litigation is the public
policy interests of promoting legitimate competition and free trade and
encouraging entrepreneurial and technological advances. 70 A court
simply creating a noncompetition agreement between Johar and Allen, stating that "[such an]
agreement in these circumstances is a standard device; however .. .it should be written by the
parties and not by the Chancellor." Id.
163. Id. However, Justice Newbern did not clearly articulate what these "problems" might
be. See id.
164. Id. Recall that the chancery court had enjoined Allen from contacting any of Johar's
then-current customers for 18 months. Id. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825.
165. Id. at 53, 823 S.W.2d at 828-29 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. See also supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
167. 174 Ark. 104, 294 S.W. 393 (1927). See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
168. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at 826. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
169. 308 Ark. at 46, 823 S.W.2d at 825.




faced with these competing interests must balance them carefully in
order to reach an equitable result.
In Allen the court properly considered the expense and initiative
undertaken by Johar in-developing its unique machinery and accumula-
ing a substantial customer base. 171 The court also evaluated Johar's ef-
forts to maintain the secrecy of its machinery and customer informa-
tion and concluded that they were reasonable under the
circumstances.172 Against these factors, the court assessed Mr. Allen's
relatively minor contributions to the success of Johar 171 and concluded
that it was not proper for Allen to appropriate for his own use informa-
tion and technology that had been developed over many years and at
great expense by Johar. 74
The Arkansas Supreme Court also construed the ATSA for the
first time in Allen. The court conducted a well-reasoned analysis of the
statutory definition of the term "trade secret" and reached what was,
with little doubt, the correct conclusion in holding that Johar's cus-
tomer list met the definition. 75 The court made it clear, however, that
not all customer lists or other confidential information will qualify as a
trade secret.1 76 The court's opinion appropriately emphasized that in
order to be protectable as a trade secret, the information sought to be
protected must not be readily ascertainable by proper means1 77 and
must be the subject of efforts reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
1 78
Possibly the most significant aspect of the Allen decision is the
Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling with regard to memorized customer
171. 308 Ark. at 48-50, 823 S.W.2d at 825-27.
172. Id. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
173. Id. at 48-50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. There was no evidence that Allen had cultivated any
new business for Johar, and the evidence established that he was not involved in developing the
dual capacity technology. Id.
174. Id. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. The chancellor found that Johar spent an enormous
amount of money to redesign its production machinery. Record at 51.
175. 308 Ark. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. The court was clearly correct in holding that
Johar's handgrip production equipment fit within the ATSA's definition of trade secret. This con-
tention is supported by the fact that the dissent did not dispute that holding. See id. at 51-53, 823
S.W.2d at 827-29 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 826-27.
177. Id. at 47, 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 825-27. The comment to the definitions section of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act states that proper means include: independent discovery; discovery by
reverse engineering; public observation of the trade secret; discovery under a license from the
owner of the trade secret; or obtaining trade secrets from published literature. UNIF TRADE
SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 438 (1990).'
178. 308 Ark. at 49-50, 823 S.W.2d at 827.
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lists. In holding that the distinction between written and memorized
customer lists is irrelevant to the issue of trade secret protection, the
court seems to have adopted the more logical view of the issue.' 79 The
policy of protecting a written list of customers which has been misap-
propriated from its owner, but refusing to protect that same list simply
because it was committed to memory rather than written down is diffi-
cult to justify. "The distinction places a premium upon good memory
and a penalty upon forgetfulness, and it cannot be justified either from
a logical or pragmatic point of view."' 0 The issue in a case such as
Allen should be whether a particular list of customers is protectable as
a trade secret, not whether the person who misappropriated that list
has a good memory.
As previously discussed, the dissenting justices believed that only
written customer lists should be afforded trade secret protection under
the ATSA.' 8 ' The basis of the dissent's argument was that the only
reasonable effort an employer can make to protect its customer list
from misappropriation by employees is to require the employees to exe-
cute noncompetition agreements.1 82 Admittedly, the most prudent
means by which an employer can protect its confidential customer in-
formation from misappropriation is by requiring its employees to exe-
cute a reasonable noncompetition agreement.18 3 However, it cannot be
absolutely stated that it is always possible for an employer to secure
such an agreement. Furthermore, the possibility that a court will de-
clare a noncompetition agreement unenforceable is always present. "
179. Id. at 50, 823 S.W.2d at 827. "[Tjhe distinction between written and memorized infor-
mation should not be encouraged. The form of the information . .. [is] unimportant; the nature of
the relationship and the employee's conduct should be the determinative factors." 2 CALLMANN,
supra note 155, § 14.31, at 109-10 (footnote omitted). See also Competitive Torts, supra note 40,
at 956 ("This memory rule in most cases seems to have little merit other than as an arbitrary rule
of thumb."); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 156, § 29.5.
180. 2 CALLMANN, supra note 155, § 14.31, at 110 (footnote omitted).
181. 308 Ark. at 52, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 52-53, 823 S.W.2d at 828-29 (Newbern, J., dissenting). The undesirable result
which such an ironclad rule might yield must be pointed out: In the absence of a noncompetition
agreement a customer list will not be entitled to trade secret protection, because it does not meet
the definition of a trade secret; however, where a noncompetition agreement is present, the cus-
tomer list will not need trade secret protection. Thus, a customer list might be denied trade secret
protection in the very circumstances in which such protection is most critical.
183. The noncompetition agreement also serves to put "the employee on notice that certain
information is considered confidential and should not be disclosed." Silberberg & Lardiere, supra
note 92, at 502.
184. This possibility is vividly illustrated by the facts in Allen. As previously discussed,
Johar had required Jerry Allen to sign a noncompetition agreement, but it was later stipulated
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Thus, the court's holding in Allen that memorized customer lists may
be afforded trade secret protection in appropriate circumstances, even
in the absence of a noncompetition agreement, seems to be the more
equitable approach. It should be emphasized, however, that employers
should not forego securing a noncompetition agreement when possible
because, as previously discussed, not all information that an employer
considers confidential will necessarily constitute a trade secret.
The dissent also questioned how Johar's customer list could cease
to qualify as a trade secret at the end of eighteen months."8 5 It is clear
that such reasoning was not the basis for the court's holding that
Johar's list of customers should only receive trade secret protection for
a limited duration. Instead, the court implicitly recognized that protect-
ing a customer list in perpetuity is not appropriate except in extraordi-
nary circumstances.18 6 The commentary to the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act clearly indicates that the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws believed that injunctive relief should last no
longer than is necessary."8 7 The court's holding in Allen that Johar's
customer list should only be protected for eighteen months appears to
be in accord with this position.1
88
The Arkansas Supreme Court's interpretation of the ATSA is con-
that the agreement was unenforceable. See supra note 12.
185. 308 Ark. at 52, 823 S.W.2d at 828 (Newbern, J., dissenting). Justice Newbern wrote,
"To say that the list in this case is a trade secret but to be protected only for 18 months raises the
question whether it is not, thereafter, a trade secret. Why does it cease to fulfill the statutory
definition after that period has passed?" Id.
186. Justice Newbern expressly recognized this principle when he stated that "in no event
should the information be protected as a trade secret in perpetuity because that would violate the
...public policy against restraint of trade . 308 Ark. at 53, 823 S.W.2d at 828-29 (New-
bern, J., dissenting).
187. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2 cmt., 14 U.L.A. 433, 449-50 (1990). The comment
reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Although punitive perpetual injunctions have been granted, ... Section 2(a) of this Act
adopts the position of the trend of authority limiting the duration of injunctive relief to
the extent of the temporal advantage over good faith competitors gained by a misap-
propriator . ...
The general principle .. .is that an injunction should last for as long as is neces-
sary, but no longer than is necessary, to eliminate the commercial advantage or "lead
time" with respect to good faith competitors that a person has obtained through
misappropriation.
Id.
188. At trial, Terry Vienna had testified that it would take two to three years for a competi-
tor to compile the information contained in Johar's customer files. 308 Ark. at 49, 823 S.W.2d at
827. Thus, an injunction prohibiting 'Jerry Allen from contacting any of Johar's customers for 18
months should adequately eliminate the commercial advantage that Allen gained by misappropri-
ating Johar's customer information.
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sistent with the purposes underlying the enactment of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act: to promote certainty regarding the parameters of
trade secret protection and to provide appropriate remedies for trade
secret misappropriation."8 9 The court's decision in Allen should facili-
tate the protecton of customer lists in appropriate circumstances and
allow employers to entrust a wide range of customer and other confi-
dential information to an employee without fear of later misappropria-
tion by that employee. This should encourage technological advances,
improve efficiency, and increase productivity.
Michael J. Ptak
189. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, 14 UL.A. 433, 434 prefatory note (1990).
[Vol. 14:693
